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BOOK REVIEWS
TH1E FoRGOrTEN NINTn AIEND-MMT. By Bennett B. Patterson. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1955. Pp. 217. $4.00.
THE Ninth Amendment states that "the enumeration in the Constitution of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
This amendment, which is the most general in the Constitution, reflects a deep-seated
desire on the part of Madison and his supporters in Congress to secure certain com-
mon law rights against invasion by the central government. It passed the House and
Senate with apparently no debate and, since its adoption, has evoked little significant
comment. Hence, Mr. Patterson's adjective, "forgotten."
The reason for the amendment's comparative obscurity stems possibly from its
clarity. It amounts to a mere assertion that, despite the fact that the Constitution
expressly protects certain enumerated rights, there are others, usually referred to as
"natural rights", which existed prior to its adoption and which should be equally safe-
guarded. For all practical purposes, the amendment amounts to nothing more than
a restatement of the "inalienable rights" of the Declaration of Independence and the
"inherent rights" of the Virginia Bill of Rights.
Strangely enough, it has never been construed by the Supreme Court. Mr. Pat-
terson indicates that this omission is probably due to a mechanical error due to the
Court's misnumbering of the Seventh as the Ninth Amendment in Livingston v. Moore,
a case involving the right of trial by jury. It is obvious that the Court was confused
due to the fact that the original Bill of Rights as proposed by Madison contained
twelve articles, the first two of which were never adopted. However, it is undoubtedly
the general-and even mythical-nature of the amendment that has prevented its con-
struction rather than a numbering error in a case where it was not applicable in the
first place. Furthermore, in view of the appropriateness of other provisions of the
Constitution, it has been unnecessary to look to the nebulous Ninth for authority.
Mr. Patterson believes that the amendment could be profitably utilized for the
protection of what he refers to as "rights of natural endowment" instead of over-
working the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Possibly, he has a
point, but it does not seem at this writing that the courts are willing to depart from
traditional constitutional standbys to resort to the "unenumerated rights" of the Ninth
which even Mr. Patterson finds difficult to define or catalogue. For my own part, I prefer
to regard his forgotten amendment as a statement of principle which should properly
have been included in the Preamble.
Lawyers will only find a portion of Mr. Patterson's slim book of professional
interest. In his first sixty-two pages, he discusses the legislative and judicial history
of the amendment in direct if not overly stimulating prose. He then rambles off into
forty pages of platitudinous discussion of such topics as "The Importance of Being an
Individual" which, while undoubtedly of interest to prospective Fourth of July ora-
tors, hardly advances the cause of legal scholarship. The last-and largest-portion
of his book is a reprint of the Annals of Congress which covers the Congressional de-
bate which preceded the submission of the Bill of Rights to the various states for
ratification. This material is undeniably interesting and is probably sufficient excuse
for publishing Mr. Patterson's effort in the first place.
WiLwAm M. Kuvsmza
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW
NEW Yoax LAW ScHoOL
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DIRECTORY or AMERiCAN JUDGES. Compiled and edited by Charles Liebman. Fore-
word by Roscoe Pound. Chicago: American Directories Corporation. Unpaged. 1955.
$15.00.
Uxrn the appearance of the present volume, no comprehensive directory of Ameri-
can judges had existed. Judges are listed in general biographical works, in govern-
ment manuals, court reporting services, but those scattered references are fragmentary
in scope and detail. There is no "Martindale-Hubbell" for judges, and while physicians,
artists, librarians, engineers, and educators are represented in specialized Who's Who
series, judges are not. Now, the Directory of American Judges fills this void, causing
us to wonder why it was not done a long time before. The need for it was never
in doubt. It is bound up with the judicial structure of the country, which provides
in the main for popular election of judges, and makes their selection a matter of
civic interest.
The impending reform of our court system underscores this point. As .Roscoe
Pound states in the foreword, the trend is toward elimination of partisanship; selection
of judges should be based more on their individual merits and less on their political
affiliation. Wider knowledge of their personal background will become increasingly
relevant to all citizens. The directory's usefulness as a general reference tool is evi-
dent. In our own specific sphere, attorneys will welcome a closer look at the "human
side" of judges, and judges themselves will be interested in personal data of their
professional kinsmen.
Every directory is as good as the responses to its questionnaires. The Directory
of American Judges cannot be blamed for such omissions as exist, i.e., names of judges
who refused to be listed or gave skimpy information. On the whole, it has notably
succeeded in unearthing the personal history of thousands of judges, their vital sta-
tistics, marital status, education, professional and extra-professional activities, associa-
tion memberships, length of term, manner of selection (election or otherwise), previous
experience, official and private addresses. Listing is alphabetical by names. A useful
and informative table of federal and state courts precedes the biographical section.
The story of judges tells incidentally the story of their courts. Aiming to include
all courts of record, the compiler discovered that the real status of many lower courts
was in doubt and that no authoritative decision, or even opinion, could be procured.
In these cases, the compiler resorted to his own judgment and may have included
courts which, by the strictest standards of selection, would have been left out. This,
actually, enhances the value of the directory and is in line with its basic policy
of broad comprehensiveness. The only other limitations it imposes on its scope,
are the exclusions of Justices of the Peace and presiding officers of administrative
tribunals. A relaxation of this rule, at least in regard to administrative tribunals, is
contemplated in the quite probable event that the demand justifies a further edition.
This directory belongs in every legal library, regardless of its size. For university,
law school and court libraries, it is a "must" for reference. Likewise, every attorney
and every judge who acquires it, will draw considerable benefit from it.
Ruor HEimmsoN
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FouNTAI oF JusTcE: A Study in the Natural Law. By John C. H. Wu. New
York: Sheed and Ward. 1955. Pp. 287. $3.75.
The author, a former member of the Legislative Yuan of the Nationalist Govern-
ment of China, has had a checkered career. He graduated from the Comparative Law
School of China, and attended some of the best universities in Europe and America.
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Upon his return to China, he became, first, professor of law and, later, Chief Justice
of the Provisional Court of Shanghai. In 1946, he was appointed Minister Plenipo-
tentiary to the Holy See. At present, he teaches at Seton Hall University Law School.
Drawing on his varied experiences as a lawyer, scholar and diplomat and on a
wealth of cases and historical quotations, the author succeeds in furnishing the reader
with a lucid and inspiring presentation of his "diffident" philosophy of law which
flows both from "Christian faith and natural reason".
Since the book has been written not only to lawyers but also "to educated people
with no special knowledge of the law", the writer finds it necessary to elaborate in
his Prologue (pp. 1-54) on the nature and scope of law, including the distinguishing
features of eternal, natural and positive laws. In so doing, he relies chiefly on the
philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.
While eternal law is the "Plan of Divine Providence" and as such is "absolutely
perfect", natural law is only "an imprint of the eternal law on the natural reason of
man, which is finite and cannot be absolutely perfect." Human law, on the other
hand, in its essential meaning is but "a compound of natural law and positive law."
If human law is contrary to the law of nature, it can no longer be regarded as law
but "a corruption of law." Thus an adequate definition of law must take account of
"the essence as well as the end and the process of the law." Its essence is "conformity
to reason", its end encompasses "the common good", and the process reflects "the
gradual realization of its essence through a progressive attainment of the end, by
means of legislation, promulgation, judgment and enforcement."
Following his introductory observations in regard to the meaning and aim of the
law, Professor Wu devotes the first part of his book (pp. 55-154) to an analysis of
the persistent characteristics of the common law in its old and new settings. He finds
that from the viewpoint of its underlying philosophy, the common law has not drifted
very far from the Christian tradition of the law of nature, since its idea of justice
essentially follows the Christian ideology which insists upon the dignity and equality
of the human person. The age of Bracton is indicative of the fact that the two funda-
mental characteristics of the common law, "the idea of the supremacy of law", and
"the practical, concrete way of dealing with cases", came "from the wisdom of the
Catholic Church." The common law, however, was not only founded on justice but
"rooted in grace". Step by step, it assimilated the principles of natural law, "not as
an abstract theory, but as vital practical rules of human conduct."
While Christopher St. Germain did not seem to represent the "scholastic tradi-
tion in its pure form", the hold of the scholastic philosophy on the common law was
too strong even after the Reformation "to be entirely uprooted." Shakespeare had
a deep sense of regard for "the dictates of natural reason", just as Holt profoundly
respected the dignity and liberty of man. The law of nature had also left its imprint
on the decisions of Lord Mansfield and on the attitude of Coke, for whom the eternal
law, the law of nature, and the law of the land formed a "continuous series". In the
course of later centuries, the natural law had gradually gone "underground" but the
common law was too deeply embedded in Christianity to be separated entirely from
the natural law tradition.
When the common law came to America, it grew "in breadth" while it retained its
"original depth". Underlying the spiritual regeneration, cosmopolitan outlook and
"immense self-confidence" of the colonists, there was "a deep faith in God and His
justice." To the Puritans and their compatriots the laws of nature and of God were
"no products of fancy, nor even mere ideals; they were absolutely real, infinitely more
real than any human laws." The early days of American jurisprudence remind the
author of the great days of the Magna Carta. Prior to the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, "all that the colonists wanted was to be the inheritors of the common law,
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the common law as Bracton, Coke, Holt, Mansfield and Blackstone understood it."
Thus in its earlier phase of development, the American philosophy of the natural law
remained attached to religion, and became "the rock on which a true democracy was
built."
In the course of the nineteenth century, under the impact of the general trend
of European thought, the philosophy of individualism, "in the sense that no one is his
brother's keeper", entered into and dominated American legal thought. Legal positivism
began "with the denial of the natural law, and has ended by creating strange gods, such
as the totalitarian state, class-dictatorship", and, "the subtlest of all, scientism or worship
of facts." In the wake of the reaction against this rationalistic individualism and legal
positivism, the author finds definite manifestations of a new trend discernible. He calls
it the trend toward "personalism", the revival of the natural-law philosophy cen-
tered on the dignity of man. He hopes that "this resurgence of spiritual idealism is
more than a temporary fashion, that it is the beginning of a truly glorious age in the
history of jurisprudence."
In the second part of his book (pp. 155-235), Professor Wu makes an attempt to
reveal the often neglected facet of Christ's persopality, namely, "His intimate relation to
law." Christ, the "Judge of Judges", the "Alpha and the Omega", sums up the spirit of the
law in the Golden Rule: "Do to other men all that you would have them do to you."
He leads the way on "the paths of equity". To Him and His Apostles, "the letter kills
while the spirit gives life." To Him, "laws are made for man, not man for the laws."
The author realizes that human laws have not embodied the tenets of Christ as
yet in all their "breadth and depth". He feels, however, that the mere fact that
they cannot be attained overnight, does not justify their dismissal from .jurisprudence:
"The changes must continue upwards until the standards of Christ shall be universally
accepted." Where the common law is at its best, the author is convinced that "Christ
Himself would have smiled upon its judgments." From the days of Bracton to con-
temporary America, the common law judges have often drawn their inspiration from
His words, just as the judges of ancient China would quote Confucius. But just as it
is impossible to appraise the old Chinese jurisprudence without a knowledge of Con-
fucianism, so it is impossible to understand the underlying spirit of the common law
without taking account of the subtle but permeating influence of .Christianity. The
source of the common law is "in the wellsprings of Christian prudence and justice,
wisdom and love." The two great systems of jurisprudence in the world have both
been "pupils in the school of Christ". They are similar in that "both nature and grace
have co-operated in their making." Professor Wu feels that it is up to the younger
generation of jurists to build up a truly fundamental legal philosophy "by resorting
to the very fountains of the common law, the spirit and teachings of Christ."
The last section, the Epilogue (pp. 236-271), is devoted to the art of law. The
author sees the essence of law in "justice, which all existing laws should endeavor to
embody as perfectly as possible." The concepts of truth, the good and the beautiful
all enter into the art of law. "For a law or a judgment to be just, it must be based
upon the true, it must aim at the good, and finally, it must be beautiful."
The general theme of Professor Wu's book is no doubt highly inspiring. Using his
Christian philosophy as a standard of measurement, it would be interesting, though
undoubtedly less inspiring, to take an excursion into the different national legal systems
to see the number of positive rules of law that might fail to qualify as more than
mere "corruptions of law." Such a survey, reflecting the true meaning, aim and ap-
plication of the respective positive laws, might reveal not only the complete lack of
a just legal system but might also be indicative of the extent of illegality in the oper-
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ations, of law-making and enforcing bodies and elite groups.1 Such a survey, itself,
might constitute the strongest denial of the true statehood character of the entity
involved. The inference, if carried to its logical conclusion, would entail far-reaching
implications and changes in the present-day practice of the law of recognition, dip-
lomatic intercourse, admission of states to international organizations, and many other
related fields. Whether and to what extent the author is aware of these implications
is not entirely clear from the monograph.
Apart from frequent repetitions and the lack of a clear dividing line between
much of the material presented in the first and second parts, Professor Wu's book,
on the whole, furnishes an enlightening reading assignment not only to the specialist
but to the general reader as well.
STEPHFN GOROVE
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW
Naw YORK LAW SCHOOL
1 Cf. Gorove, "The New Polish Constitution," 1954 VAsH. UNv. LAW Q. 261-282.
